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Abstract
Aims: This paper aims to describe the contextual factors that gave rise to evidence-based medicine (EBM), as well
as its controversies and limitations in the current health context. Our analysis utilizes two frameworks: (1) a complex
adaptive view of health that sees both health and healthcare as non-linear phenomena emerging from their
different components; and (2) the unified approach to the philosophy of science that provides a new background
for understanding the differences between the phases of discovery, corroboration, and implementation in science.
Results: The need for standardization, the development of clinical epidemiology, concerns about the economic
sustainability of health systems and increasing numbers of clinical trials, together with the increase in the
computer’s ability to handle large amounts of data, have paved the way for the development of the EBM
movement. It was quickly adopted on the basis of authoritative knowledge rather than evidence of its own
capacity to improve the efficiency and equity of health systems. The main problem with the EBM approach is the
restricted and simplistic approach to scientific knowledge, which prioritizes internal validity as the major quality of
the studies to be included in clinical guidelines. As a corollary, the preferred method for generating evidence is the
explanatory randomized controlled trial. This method can be useful in the phase of discovery but is inadequate in
the field of implementation, which needs to incorporate additional information including expert knowledge,
patients’ values and the context.
Conclusion: EBM needs to move forward and perceive health and healthcare as a complex interaction, i.e. an
interconnected, non-linear phenomenon that may be better analysed using a variety of complexity science
techniques.
Keywords: Complexity of knowledge, Evidence-based medicine, Evidence-based practice, External validity, Framing,
Generalizability, Internal validity, Randomized controlled trial
Background
Over the past 20 years or more, the concept of
evidence-based medicine (EBM) has increasingly been
accepted as the gold standard for decision making in
medical/health practice and policy.
EBM provides a standard procedure for using evi-
dence in clinical decision making. It is framed as “…the
conscientious, explicit and judicious use of best evidence
in making decisions about the care of individual [sic]
patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means
integrating individual clinical experience with the best
available external clinical evidence from systematic
research” [1]. Muir Gray regarded this definition as too
doctor-centric and expanded it to emphasize the im-
portance of the patient perspective and proposed that,
“…evidence based clinical practice is an approach to
decision making in which the clinician uses the best
scientific evidence available, in consultation with the
patient, to decide upon the option which suits the
patient best.” [2]. In their respective papers, both
Sacket and Gray described the stages of EBM decision
making as (1) assessment and synthesis of external
evidence using clinical epidemiology, systematic
search and meta-analysis, and other techniques such
as cost analysis and modelling; (2) use of probabilistic
reasoning, taking into account, clinical expertise, and
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patients’ values and preferences. Remarkably, this broad
but sensitive approach to rational clinical decision making
was actually followed when applied to guideline develop-
ment, but reduced the evidence in a skewed manner. Only
evidence from explanatory randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) was admitted as ‘reliable evidence’.
Whilst the value of EBM has been staunchly defended
by its proponents, it has been widely criticized by many
disciplines including clinical practice [3–8], epistemology
[9–14], health sociology [15, 16], and implementation
science [17]. Moreover, in recent years, previously sup-
portive EBM researchers argue for a ‘renaissance’ of the
movement that follows and applies their original broad
principles and multidisciplinary values, specially regard-
ing the components of EBM related to shared decisions
with patients and to expert judgment, built of evidence
and experience [18, 19]. The main argument is that, in
spite of its benefits, EBM could have also had important
negative consequences for healthcare delivery, policy
and financing. Examples of this include (1) failing to
manage complexity, the individual’s needs, and the per-
son’s context and issues such as multi-morbidity; (2) the
quantity of research studies and the variable quality, which
has become impossible to manage and in some cases lack
clinical significance; and (3) the medicalization of life,
namely creating new diseases for non-specific complaints
and the use of the evidence-based ‘quality markers’ to
widely promote drugs and medical devices [20–22].
This paper contributes to the descriptive rational recon-
struction of EBM by analysing its historical development
and controversies [23], as well as its limitations in the
current healthcare context. We approach this analysis
from a complex adaptive systems science perspective with
its focus on the relational interactions of health and
healthcare variables [24] and the unified approach to the
philosophy of science as suggested by Schurz [23]. A com-
plex adaptive view of health as a balanced state between
the person’s physical, social, emotional and cognitive
experiences and its consequences for shaping complex
adaptive healthcare and healthcare systems as highly
responsive to the person’s unique needs as well as a
complex adaptive understanding of medical knowledge
have been described in detail elsewhere [25–27]. The
unified approach to the philosophy of science provides a
systematization of the basic assumptions of scientific
knowledge and revises the role of values in science. It
provides a new framework for understanding the dif-
ferences between the phases of discovery, corrobor-
ation and implementation in science. Its importance
for defining new areas of scientific knowledge and
the role of different logic inferences in each phase
have been reviewed elsewhere [28].
The present paper is structured in four sections: in the
first, we review the origins, principles and actors who
contributed to the rise of EBM, whilst in the second, we
discuss why this movement evolved so rapidly and was
so broadly accepted. The third describes a ‘restricted’ ap-
proach to EBM and its use in designing standard
methods for developing practice guidelines, and finally,
we comment upon the current challenges faced by the
EBM movement in the context of systems thinking and
implementation sciences.
Where does EBM come from?
There were three factors at the beginning of the 20th
century that predated the development of EBM, namely
(1) the transformation of hospitals in the USA, from a
shelter for the sick, to prestigious organizations, where
medical care was based on scientific principles [29]; (2)
the reform of medical education [30], and (3) the birth of
clinical epidemiology [31]. The transformation of hospitals
was accompanied by a process of standardization of
healthcare provision through guidelines, which was also
closely related to the efforts of the American Medical
Association to establish its position as the reference ac-
creditation body in medicine [29]. Standardization in-
cluded the regulation of the medical profession, which
ensured surgeons were well trained; the development of
procedural standards in hospitals, which reduced variabil-
ity and improved quality; and inclusion, for the first time,
of the patient record file, allowing hospital managers
to control what the physicians were doing [32]. As
Timmermans and Berg suggested [29] the use of stan-
dards and guidelines, together with the emerging sci-
entific knowledge and technologies enabled the growth
of professional autonomy. However, standards and
guidelines also became major triggers for the decline
in clinical autonomy by the late 20th century [29].
The subject of clinical epidemiology was progressively
introduced into medical programs based on the Enlight-
enment idea that progress was achievable through ob-
jectivity and rationality, so medicine has to be a science,
not an art [29]. In 1968, McMaster University (Canada)
was the first to offer an integrative ‘problem-based learn-
ing’ curriculum, combining the studies of basic sciences,
clinical epidemiology and clinical medicine resulting
from clinical problems [31, 33]. The ‘father’ of EBM, David
Sackett, directed this department. The publication of a
series of recommendations by the Canadian Task Force
on Periodic Health Examination that was led by Sackett
[34, 35] in 1979, underscored the rationale for using in-
sights from clinical epidemiology to inform clinical prac-
tice. The findings supported recommendations to
abandon routine annual check-ups in favour of selective
approaches based on the patient’s age and sex. It was the
first time that recommendations were made according to
the ‘levels of evidence’ and exclusively based on ‘grading
study designs’, i.e. RCTs provide good evidence (level I),
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cohort studies and case–control studies provide fair evi-
dence (level II), and expert opinion arising from clinical
experience provides poor evidence (level III). Unsurpris-
ingly the same basis for grading treatment recommenda-
tions was applied from level A: to apply the intervention
to level E: not to apply the intervention.
A prerequisite for the widespread adoption of EBM re-
quired clinicians to be more critical when appraising the
scientific literature. In 1981, Sackett et al. [33] published
a series of articles in the Canadian Medical Association
Journal that explained the criteria for assessing the in-
ternal validity of study designs as RCTs providing the
gold standard for treatment, cohort studies for diagnosis,
and case–control studies for etiology or harm. However,
as Zimmerman indicated [31], this simplification was
one of the most important weaknesses of EBM. Indeed,
the major resistance to EBM relates to the specification
of the knowledge base of medicine as something
rational/technical/linear/predictable rather than contin-
gent/experiential/non-linear/unpredictable [16, 26, 36].
Managing the vast amount of research literature be-
came possible with wider availability of computers, in
particular the personal computer on the doctor’s desktop
[37]. This enabled Iain Chalmers, director of the
National Perinatal Epidemiology Unit in Oxford (United
Kingdom) in the mid 1980s, to establish an electronic
database of perinatal trials which made this information
readily accessible to clinicians [38, 39]. The concepts
and creation of electronic databases and increasing com-
puting power facilitated the democratisation of know-
ledge management, something previously confined to
only a few experts [40]. Some years later, The Cochrane
Collaboration emerged as an organisation that systemat-
ically combed, reviewed and synthesised the vast amount
of research literature to make it accessible to the
clinician at the time of the patient consultation.
Another contextual factor to explain the development
of the EBM was the rising concern about the sustainabil-
ity of health systems during the 1970s. This concern re-
sulted in the emergence of new disciplines, such as
health economics, that influenced the development of
major approaches to healthcare reform such as manager-
ialism [41] and outcomes management [42], in addition
to EBM. These three approaches focused on the ‘specific’
to achieve measurable objectives; continuous evaluation
of performance against defined objectives, outputs and
standards; and rationing of resources by effectiveness
criteria to make the work of physicians more transparent
through control and surveillance.
Closely related to the development of Health Mainten-
ance Organizations was Outcomes Management (OM)
in the United States, which adopted the principles of
quality improvement to facilitate physicians’ autonomy
and control of their clinical practice. OM follows four
major principles [42]: (1) appropriateness, which relies
on standards and guidelines; (2) routine outcome assess-
ment based on routine and systematic measures of pa-
tients’ functioning and wellbeing, along with disease-
specific clinical outcomes at appropriate time intervals;
(3) the link to data mining to pool clinical and outcome
data on a massive scale; and (4) a focus on dissemination
and impact analysis to take into account the segment of
the database most appropriate to the concerns of each
decision maker. OM differs from EBM in its emphasis
on ‘real data’ in contrast with EBM’s ‘experimental data’,
while both OM and EBM aimed to empower clinicians
to improve their clinical decision making capacity
through the new tools on offer. This contrasts markedly
with the view of managerialism, or neo-liberal ap-
proaches, where the power of decision making is shifted
from clinicians to managers and auditors [41, 43].
The need for standardization, the development of clin-
ical epidemiology, and concerns about the economic
sustainability of health systems together with the in-
creased capacity of computers to handle large amounts
of data paved the way to the development of the EBM
movement, officially founded in 1991 [33]. The publica-
tion of “Evidence-based medicine. A new approach to
teaching the practice of medicine” by the Evidence-Based
Working Group in JAMA [44] rapidly spread the concept
and principles of EBM allowing the Evidence-Based
Working Group to pronounce EBM to be a ‘new para-
digm’. It would change the ‘old way’ of ‘solely’ practicing
subjectivity-based medicine predicated on intuition, clin-
ical experience and pathophysiological rationale with an
objective approach based on ‘scientific’ evidence. Whilst
they advocated the addition of evidence as a key con-
sideration, they also clearly rejected the role of ex-
perts with ‘authoritative opinions’ as guiding clinical
decision making.
Why was EBM so widely accepted?
From 1992 until September 2015, the PubMed database
revealed over 20,000 papers with ‘evidence-based’ in
their title. Evidence-based practice guidelines are the
norm for the majority of official agencies and profes-
sional organizations, and EBM approaches are at the
core of today’s scientific thinking. The RCT is regarded
as the fundamental research response underpinning the
‘perceived new paradigm’ of EBM for healthcare [45],
and these ideas have now expanded far beyond the realm
of medicine (consider, for instance, the debate if Conser-
vation Science needs to include RCTs in the same way
medicine does: http://blog.nature.org/science/2013/08/
15/debate-randomized-control-trials-in-conservation/).
As Pope suggested [16], EBM evolved as a social
movement that started with agitation (i.e. we need to
change the current paradigm based on experience). It
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was crystalized by the shared experience of the group at
McMaster University and the development of an endur-
ing sense of purpose, disseminated in a series of position
papers, declarations, and guidelines published in influen-
tial medical journals by key opinion leaders in clinical
epidemiology. So, ironically, the adoption of EBM by the
scientific community was not based on evidence but on
authoritative knowledge, precisely the type of approach
EBM was meant to replace, a point recently acknowl-
edged by one of its key proponents, Sackett himself [46].
Use of authoritative knowledge in EBM
We can identify three factors related to authoritative
knowledge that could have played a major role in the
success of EBM: reputation, the Matthew effect, and the
invisible college.
The first ever paper on EBM written by an almost an-
onymous EBM Working Group a appeared in JAMA and
provided the movement with instant grounds of credibil-
ity. Publishing under the authorship of a working group
raised its status to that of an authoritative consensus
paper. However, as Zimmerman suggested [31], the
EBM Working Group used a language closer to a polit-
ical manifesto, calling for far-reaching changes in the
practice of medicine, in the process creating an ‘enter-
prise of scientific objectivity’. This working group, to-
gether with Drummond Rennie, deputy editor at JAMA,
remained the main advocates of the EBM movement for
the first critical years: out of 22 articles on EBM published
in the first 3 years, 12 were published by JAMA, reflecting
Rennie’s and JAMA’s remarkable commitment to the new
approach [31, 46]. This new movement was not only sus-
tained by JAMA, it also found the British Medical Journal
to be its keen European supporter [1, 47].
Within 3 years, the movement was threatened by an
equally prestigious journal, The Lancet, which took a
critical position of EBM. In 1995, an anonymous editor-
ial stating that although “The Lancet applauds practice
based on the best available evidence – bringing critically
appraised news of such advances to the attention of
clinicians is part of what peer-reviewed medical journals
do – but we deplore attempts to foist evidence-based
medicine on the profession as a discipline in itself” [48].
The Lancet has since remained one of the most critical
journals about the EBM movement. For instance, in
2005, it published a paper entitled “External validity of
randomized controlled trials: To whom do the results of
this trial apply?” criticizing the hierarchy of evidence as
its focus is internal validity, neglecting the critical issue
of external validity/generalizability of those results [49].
The reputations of the EBM movement’s key propo-
nents and authors were well established. David Sackett
and Iain Chalmers were renowned clinical epidemiologists
and worked in highly regarded institutions – McMaster
and Oxford University, respectively. Gordon Guyatt, as
co-founder of the Medical Reform Group, a Canadian
medical group composed of young doctors and nurses
based in Toronto [31], notably agitated against the prac-
tice of medicine guided by senior doctors’ opinions. Per-
sonal experience gained under extreme conditions shaped
the views of Archie Cochrane, a doctor and prisoner of
war, and Iain Chalmers, a doctor in Gaza; they realized
that in many cases new expensive treatments were no
better than older ones [50]. From any point of view, the
leading professionals were clearly well motivated but in
practice their recommendations resulted in an over-
simplified approach to ‘the clinical care of patients’.
A related reputational effect is gained from the
Matthew effect [51] – raising the credibility of a
viewpoint and an author group by excessive cross-
citation amongst its proponents,b a practice utilized
by scientists since the 17th century. As a result, a
group is highly likely to gain influence and power to set
future research, practice and policy agendas (through
grants, publications, conference presentations, etc.), made
easier by the current state of publication policies and qual-
ity assessment procedures [52].
The extraordinary ability of the major EBM players to
promote, implement and expand collaborative groups
and networking resulted in what is known as an ‘invis-
ible college’ [51]. The invisible college consists of a
group of scientists or professionals who may live in sep-
arate locations but attend the same conferences, publish
in the same journals, and invite each other to give key-
note lectures to share the same ideas. An invisible col-
lege emerged from the collaboration between the groups
at McMaster University and the Cochrane Collaboration.
One could argue that the Cochrane Collaboration over
time has morphed into a form of ‘visible college’. Indeed,
the Cochrane Collaboration’s initiative of a series of
small workshops started an international social network
of EBM supporters.
From a broad model to a narrow version of EBM
The historical and philosophical basis for EBM started
with a broad health system’s perspective. In the 1930s,
the then medical student, Cochrane, demanded on a
protest placard that “All effective treatment must be free”
[53, p. 1]. This call was about demonstrating a cost/
benefit perspective, predicated on measuring “the effect
of a particular medical action in altering the natural his-
tory [sic] of a particular disease for the better” [53, p. 2].
Cochrane argued that the RCT would remove bias and
subjective opinion from managing disease, and indeed
RCTs demonstrated important but limited gains in under-
standing therapeutic interventions. He clearly distinguished
between ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ and observed that,
while the RCT as a scientific method could demonstrate
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‘effectiveness’ in the trial population, this would not equate
to greater ‘efficiency’ in healthcare, i.e. the same outcomes
would generally not be achieved in routine practice due to
the “complexities within the health system” [53, p. 2]. In
addition, Cochrane was much more interested in the as-
pects of care crather than cure, alluding to the often
neglected concern of ‘equality’ within the health system. As
he stated: “In particular I believe that cure is rare while the
need for care is widespread [sic], and that the pursuit of
cure at all costs may restrict the supply of care, but the bias
has at least been declared” [53, p. 7].
The beginnings of the EBM approach were clearly
focused on understanding the complexities of the ‘work-
ings of the healthcare system’ and its relationship to
making the ‘best possible decision’s for the care of
patients’. However, these complexities have rapidly been
reduced to a narrow focus on standardised and typically
single disease management guidelines.
Managing scientific knowledge for practice and the
guideline development movement
One of the main objectives of EBM is to make large
amounts of scientific knowledge more accessible, and
developing clinical guidelines with recommendations to
support clinical decisions seemed the obvious way to
proceed.
Although clinical guidelines are useful they are also
limiting if, for instance, they only draw on one source of
information (i.e. the explanatory RCT). These guidelines
will also restrain the freedom of professionals to use
other sources of knowledge in their clinical decision
making, like knowing patients’ preferences and clinical
experiences [54]. Evidence-based guidelines for a specific
area of practice are typically seen by clinicians as the
penultimate and authoritative practice pathway, rein-
forced by adverse litigation and clinical review commit-
tee outcomes [29]. Consequently, many practitioners see
clinical guidelines as the main threat to adapting clinical
decisions to individual patients’ needs and contexts, i.e.
interfering with their necessary clinical autonomy. In-
deed, EBM supporters like JR Hampton, 32 years ago,
asked for the death of clinical freedom as they saw ‘clinical
judgment’ as the major obstacle to advancing medicine
[55]; only recently they realized that clinical autonomy is
needed so practitioners can use their ‘expert knowledge’
in the best interest of their patients [56].
The preoccupation with the quality of the studies used
to develop clinical guidelines most likely explains the
transformation of the broader EBM framework into its
narrower RCT-driven form. The difficulties in translat-
ing the recommendations contained in EBM guidelines
into practice and policy and the consecutive process of
revision of the reductionist EBM approach to guidelines
has been reviewed by others [49, 57, 58].
‘Grading’ knowledge
The initial problems with translating evidence-based
guidelines into practice were attributed to the difficulties
in properly rating the supporting body of research.
Hence, a detailed analysis of the grading of RCTs was sug-
gested [59]. The Grades of Recommendation, Assessment,
Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) working group
analyzed six grading systems used by 51 organizations and
found, to its surprise, poor reliability in the assessment of
the quality of studies. None of the systems were usable for
all user groups (professionals, patients and policymakers).
This study probably was the first major criticism of EBM
by one of its leading groups, concluding that the systems
for grading levels and strength of evidence had important
shortcomings for proposing clinical recommendations
[60]. The same group later recognized that the early
systems of grading, which focused almost exclusively on
randomized trials, were inadequate. The group realized
that observational studies had features that could both de-
crease or increase the quality of the supporting body of re-
search used for recommendations, and that high quality
observational studies could contribute to better clinical
decision making [61]. The factors considered when rating
evidence include the overall quality of studies, the coher-
ence of studies, uncertainties about the balance of benefits
versus harms, and uncertainties in values and opportunity
costs – reconnecting with Cochrane’s much broader
vision.
Recognition of the need to separate assessment of
quality of evidence from the strength of recommenda-
tions was a major step forward – “high quality evidence
doesn’t necessarily imply strong recommendations, and
strong recommendations can arise from low quality
evidence” [62]. However, a new question arose: who
should make these recommendations? Paradoxically,
recommendations in clinical guidelines developed by
‘EBM experts’ use the opinion of their group of experts
to work through and agree on the wording of their rec-
ommendations, grade the body of evidence, and utilize
their values and background, i.e. apply their ‘prior expert
knowledge’. However, how the information, expert opin-
ion and contextual factors are balanced in these deliber-
ations often remains unclear.
In recognition of the need for systematic and explicit
approaches in the development and grading of recom-
mendations, guideline development standards now require
a summary of findings [63, 64] or evidence statements
[65] for each recommendation and these are included in
the guideline’s technical report.
Various ways of knowing
The EBM community is starting to respond to criticism of
limiting evidence and is attempting to incorporate and
value other sources of knowledge, such as observational
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studies and the findings of qualitative research. Neverthe-
less, the fundamental flaws inherent in the grading sys-
tems remain such as the assumption that: study designs
and quality can be arranged in a systematic but simplistic
linear structure, when, in reality, the use of different and
highly relevant information such as patient preferences,
and applicability to local or practice contexts would lead
to completely different grading systems [66]; and that
studies graded according to epidemiological principles will
diminish the risk of bias. This criterion may make sense in
the discovery of new knowledge but is not the key consid-
eration if the main aim is to implement research into local
practice.
It is important to consider that scientific knowledge is
divided in three major areas: discovery, corroboration
and implementation, and that the information of one
domain cannot be directly applied to the others [23, 28].
The value-neutrality principle that guides discovery and
corroboration requires further – and complex – clarifi-
cation in the implementation phase. According to
Schurz [23], the value-neutrality requirement “implies
that the scientist separates her scientific knowledge from
fundamental value assumptions which she assumes in
means-end inferences”. Means-end inferences and abduc-
tion are used in EBM guideline development without an
adequate formalization of their contribution to the con-
struction of the guideline recommendations [28]. The
roots of this philosophical debate are far beyond the
scope of this paper and, unfortunately, the philosophy of
science principles necessary to support the underpin-
nings of EBM have as yet not been properly explored.
In the fields of discovery and corroboration the im-
portant criterion is internal validity (observed variation
can be interpreted as a causal relationship, therefore, the
study design needs to guarantee that the risk of bias is
low). In the field of implementation, the important cri-
terion is the degree of external validity of the results ap-
plicability to the local context and acceptability of the
intervention/s to the patient. External validity is import-
ant as it means that the results can be generalized to dif-
ferent persons, settings and times. There is an inverse
relationship between internal and external validity. If the
final purpose of EBM was to improve the health of real
people in real settings, external validity should be em-
phasized and strengthened. It is not only crucial to know
if a treatment is effective in controlled situations (i.e. in-
ternal validity), but also that it is going to be effective in
the real world (i.e. external validity). While the grading
systems for developing clinical guidelines used by EBM
are systematic and reliable, they often prioritize internal
validity and therefore are not ‘fit for purpose’. The em-
phasis on internal validity has contributed to the failure
of EBM, as recommendations – being based on experi-
mental designs where variables and confounders are
controlled (RCTs) – often fail to be translatable into
practice because the research context does not reflect
real world clinical practice/reality [67, 68].
The EBM and guideline communities have also recog-
nized the limited implementation of guidelines jeopardized
by their current static and unfriendly structure [18, 54, 69].
New proposals, such as the development of dynamic wiki-
based clinical guidelines, might eventually resolve this prob-
lem and enable the participation of all stakeholders (e.g. pa-
tients, clinicians and decision makers), in a collaborative
effort that may result in greater transparency and accept-
ability [70, 71].
The leap from discovery/corroboration to implementa-
tion was partly reflected in the criticism made in The
Lancet in 2005 [49] and in the position of other EBM ex-
perts such as ER Epstein, who developed the disease
management approach, superseded by Wagner’s
chronic/integrated care model [71]. Even though he ad-
hered to EBM, Epstein’s vision of health knowledge was
clearly beyond RCTs and much closer to Paul Ellwood’s
OM approach. He considered EBM as one of several
tools to improve quality of care: “The new paradigm is
population-based risk and disease assessment, systems of
disease prevention and health promotion, community-
based intervention and provider contacts within a frame-
work of automated information, evidence-based medicine,
and defined protocols of care, with explicit collection of
outcomes information” [72]. Epstein and Sherwood, al-
though subscribing to the gold-standard of RCTs, mention
the difficulty of using them as the main source of informa-
tion in outcome management/implementation and men-
tion ‘prospective effectiveness trials’ as the alternative to
RCTs [72, 73].
The limitation of RCTs to assess real world outcomes
A more fundamental question would be, can real world
outcomes be achieved/evaluated with randomized con-
trolled trials? In short, the answer is no, if we only use
explanatory randomized trials as preferred by its propo-
nents. However, pragmatic controlled trials that, by def-
inition, are conducted under usual conditions offering
practitioners considerable freedom in deciding how to
apply the intervention to be tested, are not obtrusive (i.e.
there is no special effort to improve compliance by pa-
tients or practitioners), and use administrative databases
for the detection of outcomes, can offer a valid alterna-
tive. While explanatory RCTs will be linked to discovery
and corroboration and will aspire to removing variability,
pragmatic controlled trials (even including randomization)
fit in the area of implementation and embrace variability
as the norm [74, 75]. They take into account the local con-
text and are mostly valued when driven by theory and
complemented by other sources of knowledge [76].
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In conclusion: the challenges facing EBM
Most likely, EBM grew too fast to effectively incorporate
its original propositions: evidence, expert knowledge,
and patients’ preferences [1]. The reliance of EBM on
the RCT was useful for acute (mostly single disease)
conditions treated with simple interventions, but this ap-
proach is not suitable in the current epidemiological
context characterized by chronicity and multimorbidity
in complex health systems. In particular, EBM has
largely disregarded the importance of social determi-
nants of health and local context – hence the nicknames
‘cookbook approach’ or ‘MacDonaldization’ of medicine
[29, 77]) – and its real impact on the ‘effectiveness’ and
‘efficiency’ of healthcare on the ‘equality’ of needed
healthcare services.
As an a priori, evidence is context sensitive, and there-
fore to some extent tacit [78], and both global and local
evidence need to be combined in the development of us-
able recommendations for clinical decision making [79].
Local evidence includes the presence of modifying fac-
tors in the specific settings, magnitude of needs (preva-
lence, baseline risk or status), patient values, costs (to
the patient and the system), and the availability of re-
sources in the system [80]. This local evidence needs to
be combined with ‘expert knowledge’, which should be
differentiated from ‘expert opinion’ and valued in a dif-
ferent way. By ‘expert knowledge’ we mean the implicit
knowledge that professionals have that helps them to
better understand the local conditions. It is based on
data (their accumulated experiences) and thus different
to simple opinions or feelings about something [81, 82].
There is on-going debate of the relevance of ‘colloquial
evidence’ in the development of guidelines [83]. This re-
flects a worrying lack of a basic understanding by
authors and reviewers of the fundamentals of scientific
knowledge and the differences between expert know-
ledge and evidence.
There is an imperative to explore and then learn from
other disciplines on how to use research evidence and
incorporate it with local context and expert knowledge
to achieve best possible patient outcomes. For example,
in other areas of science, e.g. conservation science and
artificial intelligence, expert knowledge is routinely in-
corporated in the analysis. Expert-Based Collaborative
Analysis is a systematic procedure to incorporate expert
knowledge into data analysis; such an approach has been
proven to be useful when dealing with complex issues
and can be seen as a powerful tool in the current health
context characterized by an increase in the number of pa-
tients with multiple conditions, resulting from heteroge-
neous genomic/pathophysiological pathways and diverse
personal needs [81].
In future, the inclusion of ‘expert knowledge’ in the
analysis of research data might produce more usable
evidence for clinical decision-making. In this sense, EBM
needs to go beyond the sole use of the RCT and acknow-
ledge that scientific knowledge is multidimensional and
cannot be arranged in only one hierarchical system.
Knowledge coming from studies using different meth-
odological approaches is complementary [28]. Hence, to
have a complete picture, information coming from ex-
planatory RCTs has to be complemented and contrasted
with information coming from pragmatic RCTs evaluat-
ing effectiveness in routine practice. This implies some
loss of ‘internal validity’ and an increase in the uncer-
tainty of the results, but ‘gains in representativeness’.
The most important challenge facing the EBM-
movement is the provision of a detailed description of
its methods for scientific reasoning. This requires an
analysis of its taxonomic principles, including formal
definitions of ‘scientific knowledge’, ‘evidence’, and ‘deci-
sion making’ in health, as well as the different types of
logic inferences used in the scientific reasoning process
[28]. As others have highlighted, we believe that this aca-
demic exercise is crucial to clarify the confusion between
‘good’ evidence [84] and scientific ‘truth’. Apart from
systems thinking [85, 86], healthcare researchers, clini-
cians and policymakers could benefit from greater know-
ledge of the philosophy of science to design and
interpret research, and their use in guiding decision
making processes – beyond the classical experimental/
deductive approach favoured by the EBM movement
[18, 23, 28, 87].
It should also be highlighted that health systems re-
search involves different disciplines (including social
ones) with different perspectives, epistemologies, and
ways of conceptualizing and conducting research. Health
systems research, as intimated by Cochrane, is broader
than identifying ‘clinical effectiveness’ – ‘efficiency’ and
‘equality’ are equally important considerations for
achieving successful implementation of health system
improvement; therefore, all stakeholders’ fundamental
value assumptions should be explicit.
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the empirical evidence of the great benefits of care, its
scientific basis has been untangled by the study of
psychoneuroimmunology.
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